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1. “I ATE IN THE BEST RESTAURANTS OF EGYPT.” 
Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, aka Abu Omar, is not only a name.1 He is a 
true story. As a member of the extremist Egyptian organization called “Jamaa 
Islamiya,” he is a good friend of certain Al Qaeda affiliates. On 1997, after a 
long stay in Afghanistan and Bosnia, he moved to Albania and subsequently to 
Italy: Puglia, then Rome and Milan, where he became an imam in the mosque 
on Jenner boulevard. This place is located within ten minutes walking distance 
from my parents’ home. 
                                                 
* Visiting Scholar 2007, Uppsala University Law School; LL.M. 2007, Yale Law 
School; Ph.D. 2007, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy; Attorney-at-Law, Milan, Italy; J.D. 
Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy. I am very grateful to Professor Iain Cameron 
of the Uppsala University Law School, for his precious suggestions concerning the present 
article and for the kind invitation to his beautiful Upplander city. 
† High Court of Justice (Isr.) 168/91, Morcos v. Minister of Defense, 45(1)P.D. 467, 470-
471 (Aharon Barak op.). 
1 See Guido Olimpio, Operazione Hotel California (2005), at 36. 
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On February 17, 2003, Abu Omar was walking from his home to the 
mosque, per his usual daily routine. When he reached Guerzoni Street, a narrow 
and isolated road, two men stopped him and asked him to identify himself. 
With no time for an explanation, he was suddenly pushed into a van, injected 
with a sedative, and driven away. A woman walking on the other side of 
Guerzoni street assisted at the event. Three days later, Abu Omar’s wife 
informed the police of her husband’s disappearence. The Italian antiterrorism 
task force, DIGOS,2 immediately suspected a kidnapping. In mid-March, the 
United States informed the Italian services that Abu Omar was actually in the 
Balkans. However, in mid-April, Italian police started to wiretap several phone 
calls from Egypt to Abu Omar’s wife. “I ate in the best Egyptian restaurants” –
– Abu Omar said in one of these calls.3 Yet in truth he had been brutally 
tortured by Egyptians. They administered electric shocks to his genitals and 
subjected him to loud music. As a result, Abu Omar became incontinent and 
lost hearing in one ear.4 All of the calls with his wife and friends, especially one 
who later collaborated with the prosecutors, were wiretapped. The DIGOS 
began their investigation by analyzing the phone traffic on Guerzoni Street on 
the day of February 17, 2003, and the discovery was astonishing: in the same 
time frame, several calls were made, respectively, to Langley, Virginia, the U.S. 
embassy in Milan, and Aviano. One of these lines of communication was later 
revealed to have been used in Egypt beginning on the day of the event and 
continuing until mid-March, 2003, led the investigators to a U.S. diplomat at 
the embassy in Milan. Clearly, the CIA had been involved in the kidnapping. 
Abu Omar’s case is not an isolated one. There are other stories like his 
one, perhaps hundreds. On October 23, 2001, Jamil Qasim Saeed Mohammed, 
a Yemeni national suspected of being involved in the bombing of USS Cole in 
2000, had been taken into custody by ISI5 agents in Karachi, Pakistan, and 
forced by CIA agents to move out to Jordan.6 In the meanwhile, Mahdouh 
Habib, an Austrialian and Egyptian national, was transferred from Pakistan to 
Egypt, and forced under torture to sign a confession of affiliation with Al 
Qaeda, which he subsequently retracted.7 Eight weeks later, Swedish 
                                                 
2 DIGOS means “Direzione Investigazioni Generali e Operationi Speciali” [Department 
of General Investigations and Special Operations] and is the core of antiterrorist investigation 
structure in Italy. 
3 Olimpio, supra note 1, at 29. 
4 Stephen Grey & Don van Hatta, Jr., In Italy, Anger at U.S. Tactics Colors Spy Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at A1. 
5 The term “ISI” stands for “Inter-Service Intelligence” and indicates the Pakistani secret 
services. 
6 The event became known because, once charged the plane with the suspect, the 
operator refused to pay the fees due to the Pakistani airport authorities. Thus the plane stayed 
several hours stopped on the runway and eventually was left to flee thanks to ISI’s pressions. 
See TREVOR PAGLEN, A.C. THOMPSON, TORTURE TAXI. ON THE TRAIL OF THE CIA’S RENDITION 
FLIGHTS (2006), 59-60. 
7 Mahdouh Habib was arrested in Karachi, while he was on a bus, on October 5, 2001. 
He has been detained in Egypt, then in Afghanistan and finally in Guantanamo Bay. He has 
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Sakerhetpolisen (SÄPO) arrested two men, Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed Zeri, 
and rushed them to Egypt, where they have been subjected to the worst 
imaginable abuses.8 In 2002, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi was arrested in Afghanistan 
and moved to the USS Bataan, in the Persian Sea, eventually to be rendered to 
Egypt, where the information that he released under torture has been used to 
sustain a purported link between Osama bin Laden’s organization and Saddam 
Hussein,9 denied by the CIA itself at the time. The same year, an Ethiopian 
student, Binyam Mohammed, was abducted in Pakistan and moved to 
Afghanistan and Morocco for interrogation under torture.10 On September, 
2002, a Canadian citizen, Maher Arar, was seized by the U.S. immigration 
authorities while travelling from Tunis to Montréal via New York JFK airport; 
he was forcibly moved to Syria –– belonging to the “Axis of Evil”11 (sic!), 
where the police detained him for almost a year in a 3-foot by 6-foot dirty 
room, beat him and threatened him with electrocution.12 In March, 2002, Abou 
Elkassim Britel, a Moroccan and Italian national, was removed from Pakistan to 
Morocco, where he was subjected to torture and sentenced to 9 years in prison 
after a secret trial.13 On New Year’s Eve 2003, Khaled el-Masri –– whose name 
was confused with that of Khalid al-Masri, a significant member of Al Qaeda 
                                                                                                                                  
been released on January, 2005, and now is involved in certain political activity in New South 
Wales.   
8 See Stephen Grey, United States: Trade in Torture, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, 
available at http://mondediplo.com/2005/04/04usatorture. 
9 See Dana Priest, Al Qaeda-Iraq Link Canted. Captured Libyan Reverses Previous 
Statement to CIA, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2004, at A24.   
10 See MI6 and CIA ‘Sent Student to Morocco to be Tortured,’ THE OBSERVER, Dec. 11, 
2005. 
11 Because Syria is in the so-called “Axis of Evil,” the United States can hardly justify 
the sending of a terrorist to that country; yet, obviously there are certain political junctures 
between Syria and the U.S., under which they actually collaborate, especially because of the 
presence of American forces in the nearby Iraq. Presumably, the same reason brought the U.S. 
to halt renditions to Syria. See Katherine R. Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic 
Assurances and the Legality of “Rendition,” 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 213 (2006), at 263 (“[t]he 
official said the U.S. stopped sending prisoners to Syria beacuse of concerns over suspects’ 
treatment, but that may not have been the only factor; tensions with Syria over the situation in 
Iraq were mounting at approximately the same time”). Moreover, “[e]ven when diplomatic 
relations between two countries are strained, as they are between the United States and Syria, 
sometimes intelligence services are able to work out mutually beneficial deals. That is, 
sometimes the relationship between spymasters is quite different from the relationship between 
diplomats. Not always do the scenes on stage correspond with that goes on off the stage.” A. 
John Radsan, A More Regular Process for Irregular Rendition, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 
(2006), at 24. 
12 The case of Maher Arar is particularly well-know, because of its international and 
domestic implications after the detainee’s release. 
13 A good summary of Britel’s accident is contained in a parliamentary inquiry, raised by 
some members of the Italian Parliament to the government. See Senate of Republic (Italy), Act 
No. 3-00291 (Dec. 12, 2006). See also StateWatch, Italy/Morocco Renditions: Italian and 
European MPs set to request pardon for Abou Elkassim Britel, at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jan/10britel.htm. 
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linked to the “Hamburg cell” –– was arrested at the border checkpoint at 
Tabanovce, Macedonia, and then transferred to a CIA facility in Afghanistan. 
Here, el-Masri was detained, interrogated and tortured for five months. Then, 
he was taken to Albania and abandoned in a field road. The list is not over.14 
Turning back to Abu Omar, on June 23, 2005, an Italian public prosecutor 
obtained from the judge of the Tribunal of Milan, Chiara Nobili, a warrant 
against thirteen CIA agents for Abu Omar’s abduction.15 One day later, another 
judge, Guido Salvini, issued a warrant against Abu Omar charging him with 
international terrorism.16 In the order seeking Abu Omar’s pretrial 
incarceration, Judge Salvini affirmed that “Abu Omar’s kidnapping is not only 
illegal, for it breached Italian sovereignty, but it is also an ill-omened and 
polluting act with regard to the whole fight against terrorism.”17 In Dr. 
Salvini’s view, Abu Omar was a victim of a program called “Extraordinary 
Rendition Program” (ERP).18 Yet it is only a non-technical term, the legal one 
being “abduction,” the French version for “enlèvement criminal.”19  
                                                 
14 For a complete list see the table published at 
www.nyuhr.org/docs/Case%20Annex%20Final.pdf. 
15 Judge Presiding over Preliminary Investigation [Giudice per le Indagini Preliminari, 
GIP], Dr. Chiara Nobili, Tribunal of Milan, file no. 10838/05, Arrest warrant (June 22, 2005), 
available at http://www.statewatch.org/rendition/ rendition.html [in English]. 
16 GIP, Dr. Guido Salvini, Tribunal of Milan, file no. 5236/02, Order establishing the 
imprisoment provisional measure (June 24, 2005), available at http://www.statewatch.org/ 
cia/documents/milan-tribunal-abu-omar.pdf [only in Italian] (hereinafter, “Salvini’s Order”). 
17 Salvini’s Order, supra note 16, at 10 [“[q]uindi il sequestro di Abu Omar non solo è 
stato illegale avendo violato gravemente la sovranità italiana ma è stato anche un atto nefasto e 
inquinante ai fini dell’efficacia della complessiva lotta al terrorismo”]. 
18 The word “rendition” has no technical meaning. Indeed, “[t]he term is, of course, a 
euphemism for abduction and subsequent transfer designed to circumvent ordinary extradizion 
procedures.” David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture, 46 
VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2006), at 586. Moreover, “[t]his is not a term used in international law. The 
term refers to one State obtaining custody over a person suspected of involvement in serious 
crime (e.g. terrorism) in the territory of another State and/or the transfer of such a person to 
custody in the first State’s territory, or a place subject to its jurisdiction, or to a third State. 
“Rendition” is thus a general term referring more to the result – obtaining a custody over a 
suspected person – rather than the means.” European Commission for Democracy Through Law 
(“Venice Commission”), Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of COE Member 
States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, No. 
363/2005, CDL-AD(2006)009 (March 17, 2006), par. 30, available online at http://www.venice. 
coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-AD(2006)009-e.asp (hereinafter “Venice Commission’s Opinion”). 
Actually, the term is used in a legal context in the U.S., where an appropriate “rendition clause” 
at the federal constitutional level provides for the surrendering of individuals between the 
states. See U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2. 
19 Salvini’s Order, supra note 17, at nt. 9. Salvini explains that the term “Extraordinary 
Rendition” has no technical denotation and seems rather justificatory, while under international 
law such an action is called “abduction,” or, in French, “enlèvement criminal.” See Vincent 
Coussirat-Coustère & Pierre M. Eisemann, L’enlèvement des personnes privées et le droit 
international, 76 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DR. INT. PUBLIC 346 (1972). 
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The subject of the present article is the illegality of the ERP.20 In fact, 
ERP actions raise important legal questions from both domestic and 
international viewpoints.21 Its legality has been challenged in several ways, 
through public debates and condemnations, diplomatic protests, and lawuits.22 
This article argues that the current international law framework, fueled by a 
fierce European campaign against the ERP, clearly demonstrates the illegality 
of this program. First, we will deal with the factual and legal structure of the 
ERP (§ 2) as a premise for the following analysis. Second, we will determine 
whether the ERP violates the international law norms concerning the ban on 
torture (§ 3), and, third, we will examine the inconsistency in European 
reactions to it and the way in which these reactions may affect the future ERP’s 
exploitation by the U.S. Administration (§ 4). Some conclusions will finally be 
made (§ 5). 
2. UNDER THE COLOR OF “ADAPTATION” 
The term ERP contains the adjective “extraordinary.” It basically means 
that its actions are contingent on a particular moment, characterized by unusual 
circumstances. It could also mean that either the Rendition Program is part of a 
government’s larger strategy of emergency response to global terror, or that its 
legal framework is very specifically connected to particular situations. Finally, 
it could mean that it is lawless.23 Yet none of those explanations does justice to 
the true legacy of the ERP. 
The ERP is intimately connected with the global fight against terrorism. 
Such actions took place even before 9/11.24 Their legal framework resides in 
                                                 
20 Signally, “[w]hether a particular “rendition” is lawful will depend upon the laws of the 
States concerned and on the applicable rules of international law, in particular human rights. 
Thus, even if a particular “rendition” is in accordance with the national law of one of the States 
involved (which may forbid or even regulate extraterritorial activities of State organs), it may 
still be unlawful under the national law of the other State(s). Moreover, a “rendition” may be 
contrary to customary international law and treaty or customary obligations undertaken by the 
participating State(s) under human rights law and/or international humanitaria law.” Venice 
Commission’s Opinion, supra note 18, par. 30. 
21 This article will not deal with the problem of ERP’s consistency with the U.S. 
Constitution. Some issues concerning specifically the problem of secrecy will be dealt with 
infra at par. 4. 
22 ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE. CIA INTERROGATION, FROM THE COLD 
WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2006), at 171-177. 
23 Likewise, see Venice Commission’s Opinion, supra note 18, par. 31. 
24 In 1995, in Zagreb, Croatia, some CIA agents seized an allegedly Egyptian extremist, 
Talaat Fouad Quassem, detained him for interrogation on a ship in the Adriatic Sea and then 
transferred him to Egypt, where he disappeared. His family think he had been executed in 
Egypt. See Anthony Shadid, America Prepares the War on Terror; US, Egypt Raids Caught 
Militants, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 7, 2001. Also, in 1998, seven people were grabbed by the 
Albanian police and moved to Egypt on a CIA flight. In the same year, three people, Ahmed 
Salama Mabrouk, Essam Hafez and Ihab Muhammad Saqr, were trasferred by the CIA from 
Azerbaijan to Egypt and tortured there. 
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the Presidential directives to the CIA, enacted in 1995. At that time, a wave of 
terrorism had stirred the Clinton Presidency to  action. The World Trade Center 
in 1993, Oklahoma City and Tokyo in 1995 were all rocked by terrorist 
assaults. Although there was no connection between those events, the U.S. 
government decided to expand the CIA’s powers in order to prevent further 
tragedies. Thus, Clinton enacted the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39: 
 
“[w]hen terrorists wanted for violation of U.S. law are at large overseas, their return 
for prosecution shall be a matter of the highest priority […]. If we do not receive 
adequate cooperation from a state that harbors a terrorist whose extradition we are 
seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to induce cooperation. Return of 
suspects by force may be effected without the cooperation of the host government 
[…].”25 
 
Initially, the main addressee of the PDD 39 was the FBI.26 United States 
should identify terrorists and then seek the cooperation of the involved country. 
Identification and cooperation were thus the paradigms underlying the PDD 39. 
However, “[o]nce terrorist is located, more detailed information […] is usually 
required to effect an arrest. Intelligence officers, and their sources, on the 
scene are usually better able to do that than enforcement officers from the 
United States.”27 Efficiency and efficacy thus, by this understanding, require 
the exploitation of intelligence agencies, which have contacts and information 
at the local level that enforcement agencies such as the FBI rarely have. The use 
of intelligence has consequences for the legal framework of inter-state 
cooperation. In fact, normally cooperation between law enforcement entities of 
different countries is based on treaties, especially extradition treaties.28 Yet 
international treaties are concluded only following long negotiations between 
the concerned governments, and their enforcement could prove to be very 
problematic. On the contrary, using intelligence would allow counterterrorism 
measures to proceed more quickly, thereby leaving terrorists less time and 
breathing space to plan their deadly attacks. For these reasons, the CIA was 
immediately enlisted to carry out the rendition strategies of the U.S. 
government. Here is what is really extraordinary: that renditions are conducted 
by the CIA outside the confines of any international treaty, answerable only to 
                                                 
25 Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (June 21, 1995), 
available also online at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm. See Douglas Kash, 
Abducting Terrorists Under PDD-39: Much Ado About Nothing New, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
139 (1997), at 141. 
26 See Yonah Alexander, United States, in YONAH ALEXANDER, COUNTERTERRORISM 
STRATEGIES. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF SIX NATIONS 9-43 (2006), at 29 (the PPD “designated 
the FBI as the lead agency for investigating acts against American citizens worldwide”). 
27 Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (2001), at 118. 
28 Cf. ISIDORO ZANOTTI, EXTRADITION IN MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS 
(2006), pp. 48-89. 
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contingent motives such as prevention or immediate political convenience.29 
Whilst the identification-cooperation duality corresponds to the legal mission of 
enforcement agencies, prevention requires, in addition, that those who have the 
relevant information act directly, even if this means in an outlaw context. 
One should ask what purpose lies in such a highly structured ERP. 
Interviewed by some journalists before her visit to Europe on December 2005, 
the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice affirmed that “[r]enditions […] 
save lives.”30 She was asked to specifically respond to the claims that some 
European countries were hosting CIA prisons for interrogating and torturing 
suspected terrorists. While neither denying nor confirming these prisons’ 
existence,31 Condoleezza Rice answered very firmly that:  
 
“[w]e must track down terrorists who seek refuge in areas […] where the terrorists 
cannot in practice be reached by the ordinary processes of law. […] The captured 
terrorists of the 21st century do not fit easily into traditional systems of criminal or 
military justice, which were designed for different needs. We have to adapt.”32  
 
The concept of “adaptation” seems to form the spine of Rice’s entire 
speech. She speaks of the adaptation of governmental actions to the unique 
status of captured terrorists, which draws law far afield from the traditional 
justice context. One should adapt to terrorists’ conduct, on the one hand, and to 
the particular situation, on the other. Where a country – Condoleezza Rice 
argues – cannot extradite or prosecute a terrorist, the negotiation or enforcement 
of an extradition treaty is not a viable option. The U.S. must act promptly, 
possibly with the cooperation of the territorial state: here, Rice assumes that 
rendition actions are compatible with international law.33 Clearly, this recourse 
to “adaptation” represents an effort to bring under existing laws actions which 
                                                 
29 Precisely, “[t]he rendition techniques […] are extraordinary in the legal sense, since 
extradition exists as an ordinary legal process. However, recourse to these techniques may well 
be due to the frustration of a requesting state following formal channels of rendition.” M. 
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed, 
2002), p. 251.  
30 ‘Renditions Save Lives:’ Condoleezza Rice’s Full Statement, TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 5, 
2005. 
31 Currently the public opinion knows that these prisons actually exist, and they are 
located in Poland and Romania. See Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (Council of 
Europe), Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfer of Detainees Involving the Council of Europe 
Member States: Second Report, Explanatory Memorandum, AS/Jur (2007) 36 (June 7, 2007) 
(hereinafter, “Marty’s Committee Second Report”), para. 198 (on “[s]ecret detention operations 
at Stare Kiejkuty [Poland]) and 201 ff. (“[s]ecret detention operations in Romania.”)  
32 ‘Renditions Save Lives’, supra note 30. 
33 Condoleezza Rice added that “[i]n some situations a terrorist suspect can be extradited 
according to traditional judicial procedures. But there have long been many other cases where, 
for some reason, the local government cannot detain or prosecute a suspect, and traditional 
extradition is not a good option. In those cases the local government can make the sovereign 
choice to cooperate in a rendition. Such renditions are permissible under international law and 
are consistent with the responsibilities of those governments to protect their citizens.” Ibid. 
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evidently have no legal basis. One symptom of the “adaptation” pathology is 
represented by the attempt to arrange typical operations of criminal statute, such 
as the arrest, outside the framework of the ordinary criminal process, i.e. 
without a formal indictment. This is what emerges from the so-called 
“Memorandum of Notification,” a classified directive signed by President 
George W. Bush on September 17, 2001.34 This directive allows the CIA to 
render terrorists without governmental approval and to carry out renditions 
abroad without any formal criminal charge, but merely for the purpose of 
interrogation. It establishes measures restraining individual freedom without 
due process of law. That is what Condoleezza Rice, in reality, was assuming: 
rendition is an “adaptation” of intelligence structures to the temporary need of 
making dangerous terrorists harmless. Nevertheless, as we will see shortly, the 
ERP remains essentially beyond the law. The claim that the goal of prevention 
makes the action legal is anything but well-grounded. 
3. THE COMPLEX LEGACY OF THE ERP 
Normally, all ERP actions have two common components.35 First, they 
concretize an abduction, that is a forced and illegal taking of an individual. This 
component clearly entails an often violent restraint on physical freedom. 
Second, ERP actions involve the transfer of the individual to countries where 
law enforcement authorities or intelligence agencies notoriously practice 
torture. To be sure, “[t]here were no cases where a prisoner was released, or 
had contact with a family member, human rights worker, or other visitor, and 
did not make any allegations of torture.”36 The use of torture is significant 
because ERP actions aim to obtain information from the abducted individual; 
that is ultimately the reason why the CIA exploits the assistance of countries 
where torture is covertly admitted.37 This is the key: another country is doing 
                                                 
34 Shaun Waterman, Ex-CIA Lawyer Calls for Law on Rendition, UPI, Mar. 9, 2005, 
available online at http://www.spacewar.com/news/2005/upinews-030905-1410-52.html. 
35 It has been noticed that “collectively the cases […] testify to the existence of an 
established modus operandi of rendition, put into practice by an elite, highly-trained and highly-
disciplined group of CIA agents who travel around the world mistreating prisoner after prisoner 
in exactly the same fashion.” EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRATY THROUGH LAW 
(VENICE COMMISSION), EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, Speech given 
by M. Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, Cardozo School of Law, Sept. 25, 2006 [hereinafter 
“Olivier Dutheillet Speech”], par. I.3, available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL(2006) 077-e.asp. 
36 Katherine Hawkins, supra note 11, at 264. 
37 This component is currently present in some definitions given by courts and scholars. 
See, for instance, El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (“since the early 1990s the CIA has 
been operating interrogation centers in countries where the United States believes legal 
safeguards do not constrain efforts to interrogate suspected terrorists. This practice is 
commonly known as ‘extraordinary rendition’.” Emphasis added); El-Masri v. United States, 
2007 WL 625130 (C.A. 4 (Va.)) (ERP is “the clandestine abduction and detention outside the 
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the “dirty job” of interrogating the suspected terrorist. We will address both 
components in the subsequent chapters. 
3.1. CAN ABDUCTION BE JUSTIFIED? 
Under classic international law, states have a duty to refrain from 
exercising their sovereign powers on the territory of other states.38 Accordingly, 
the taking of foreign citizens in a foreign country is generally forbidden.39 If the 
taking is illegal under international law, one should use the term “abduction.” 
However, as a matter of sovereignty, the territorial state can consent to the 
operation, in which case the taking is considered to be perfectly legal. 
First, customary international law provides for the lawfulness of an 
international law violation which is justified by the concerned State’s consent.40 
However, this consent must be “valid”41 and the action taken accordingly must 
respect the consent’s limits.42 While the latter condition relates to the specific 
case at issue, the question of the validity of consent is generally governed by 
the applicable norms, in particular those regulating the power of State agents 
and the consent in the field of treaties.43 In this respect, the law of treaties 
requires that for a State to be bound by a treaty obligation, its agent must show 
his “plein povoirs” or, in case of a common practice, it must result from therein 
that the agent does have the powers as a State representative.44 Accordingly, in 
the ERP context, consent must be given by an agent with appropriate powers, a 
                                                                                                                                  
United States of persons suspected of involvement in terrorist activities using methods 
impermissible under U.S. and international law.” Emphasis added).  
38 See ‘Lotus’ (France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A.), No. 9 (Sept. 7, 1927). 
39 Under international law abduction still stands as an “offence[…] of grave concern to 
the international community, having severe consequences for the rights of the victims and for 
the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among States.” S.C. Res. 579 (1985), 
preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (Dec. 18, 1985). 
40 This principle translates a customary international law norm. See Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law 
Commission at its fifty-third session (2001), U.N.G.A.O.R., 56th sess., Supp. no. 10 (A/56/10) 
(hereinafter “Draft Articles”), art. 20 (stating that “[v]alid consent by a State to the commission 
of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former 
State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.”) 
41 Ibid. 
42 In fact, “wrongfulness is precluded provided that the act is within the limits of the 
consent given.” MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed., 2003), at 707. 
43 In particular, “[w]ho has authority to consent […] depend on the rule,” and with 
respect of consent’s coercion, error or fraud, “the principles concerning the validity of consent 
to treaties provide relevant guidance.” JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION’S ARTICLE ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY. INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARY 
(2002), at 164. 
44 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed on May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, art. 7(1)(a), (b). 
WHEN ‘EXTRAORDINARY’ MEANS ILLEGAL 
 10
serious question arises as to whether the assurances given by a member of the 
intelligence are legally adequate to grant the consent.45 
Second, it is commonly asserted by some scholars that, even in the case 
that the territorial state did not consent to the operation, there is room to retain 
the legality of the ERP action from the standpoint of international law. In order 
to determine the lawfulness of the ERP in this case, some scholars recall the 
non-inquiry doctrine, or rule of “male captus bene detentus,” according to 
which domestic criminal courts may not ascertain whether the circumstances of 
the arrest were in violation of international law.46 In other words, although the 
circumstances reveal that the government acted illegally, this does not affect the 
courts’ power to adjudicate the case. The scholars rely on a well-established 
jurisprudence in order to affirm that the arrest, and the subsequent trial, remain 
legal despite the international law violation. Signally, the famous cases Ker,47 
Frisbie,48 Eichmann,49 Argoud50 and, more recently, Alvarez-Machain,51 would 
confirm this point.52 
In my view, however, this argument must be rejected. First of all, there is 
some confusion surrounding the male captus rule, because the precedents 
usually called upon to support it are often misunderstood or misapplied,53 and 
                                                 
45 Take, for instance, Abu Omar. Here, the CIA agents acted with the complicity of the 
director of the SISMI, Niccolò Pollari. Whether Pollari is really responsible for complicity in 
kidnapping Abu Omar will be presumably ascertained by the judges in Milan. However, the 
extent to which Pollari consented to the CIA’s action may be relevant for settling the problem 
of Italian authorities’ consent to the action itself. From this viewpoint, certainly Pollari has no 
powers to sign agreements with foreign secret agents, neither the practice of the U.S.-Italy 
relations seems to prove otherwise. 
46 See Douglas Kash, supra note 25, pp. 153-154; critically, Silvia Borelli, The Rendition 
of Terrorist Suspects to the United States: Human Rights and the Limits of International 
Cooperation, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 331 (Andrea 
Bianchi ed., 2004), pp. 353-362. 
47 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). 
48 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). 
49 Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, District Court of 
Jerusalem (no. 40/61), 36 INT’L L. REP. 5, esp. par. 41. 
50 Cour de Cassation, Judgm. June 4, 1964 (fr.), reprinted in JOURNAL DU DR. INT. 93 
(1965).  
51 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 673 (1992). 
52 Indeed, “[w]ith rare unanimity and undeniable justification the court of the world have 
held that the manner in which an accused has been brought before a court does not and, indeed 
cannot deprive it of its jurisdiction.” Frederick Alexander Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution 
of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF 
PERPLEXITY. ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE  407 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1988), at 414. 
53 The principle of male captus bene detentus is highly contested in some domestic 
cases. In particular, “if on the one hand it may still be premature to affirm the existence of a 
customary rule […] compelling the courts to divest themselves from jurisdiction over abducted 
defendants, it would on the other hand be extremely inaccurate to maintain […] that ‘the 
violation of [international] law does not affect the validity of the subsequent exercise of 
jurisdiction over [illegaly seized] offenders’ [quoting IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed., 1998), at 320].” Borelli, supra note 46, p. 361. Moreover, “the 
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indeed apparently overruled by the recent practice.54 Domestic courts constantly 
try to bring rendition cases back to the treaty norms of extradition.55 Second, 
and more generally, the ERP must be distinguished from the legal environment 
in which the male captus rule had emerged. In fact, the male captus rule applies 
to criminal trials held later against the kidnapped person. The ERP’s exclusive 
purpose, instead, is interrogation. No criminal trial is initiated, no criminal 
charge is brought against the abducted people, and indeed, as a general matter, 
instruments of criminal law are avoided.56 It is, as we mentioned above, the 
paradigm of “adaptation.”57 Third, one must emphasize that the simple 
adjudication of an abducted criminal does not legitimate a violation of human 
rights law,58 nor when the operation occurred with the approval of the territorial 
                                                                                                                                  
courts of the world have […] failed the decisive question. This is not whether jurisdiction 
exists, but whether jurisdiction should be exercised.” Mann, supra note 52, at 414. 
54 In some cases, for instance, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia [ICTY] has affirmed that the illegality of the arrest generally does affect the Court’s 
jurisdiction, but nevertheless the trial can be validly initiated if the violations of the accused’s 
rights have not been “of such an egregious nature.” ICTY, IT-94-2-PT, Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikolic, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction by the Tribunal 
(Oct. 9, 2002), par. 104; similarly, IT-95-13a-PT, Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic, Decision 
on the Motion for Release by the Accused (Oct. 22, 1997) (distinguishing between “luring” and 
“kidnapping,” only the latter raising issues related to jurisdiction). See Aparna Sridhar, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s Response to the Problem of 
Transnational Abduction, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 343 (2006), at 355 ff.; Michael P. Scharf, The 
Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanovic: Irregular Rendition and the ICTY, 11 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
369 (1998), at 379-381. 
55 Borelli, supra note 46, at 346 (“[a]n emerging body of jurisprudence suggests that 
when an accused has been forcibly abducted from another national jurisdiction – particularly if 
the abduction was done with the aid of the same government that subsequently seeks to 
prosecute him – a court may exercise its supervisory authority and decline to try the accused.”) 
See also Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] A.C. 1254; Director of Public 
Prosecutors v. Humphreys, [1976] 2 All E.R. 497. 
56 To be sure, “[n]one of the current estimated 3,000 captives was charged with 
recognizable criminal offense.” John Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against 
Terrorism: Guantanamo and Beyond, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457 (2003), at 459. 
57 See supra § 2. 
58 See Borelli, supra note 46, at 356, arguing that “with the development of international 
human rights law, the issue of forcible abduction can be framed in ways other than the 
traditional issue of inter-State responsibility.” See also Royal J. Stark, The Ker-Frisbie-Alvarez 
Doctrine: International Law, Due Process, and United States Sponsored Kidnapping of 
Foreign National Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT’L L. 113 (1999), at p. 134 (demonstrating that the 
male captus doctrine “cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s expansion of the concept 
of due process, which now protects the accused against pretrial illegality by denying the 
government the fruit of its exploitation of any deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness on its 
part”). The last cited scholar, in support of its argument, mentions United States v. Toscanino, 
500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) and Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), as examples 
where U.S. courts refused to refer to Ker and established that jurisdiction on specific cases 
depended on the government’s previous misconduct with regard to the accused’s abduction. 
Remarkably, in Toscanino the federal Court recalls art. 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and art. 17 of 
the Charter of the Organization of American States (holding that the territory of a Member State 
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state.59 In particular, forced abduction is clearly an arbitrary deprivation of 
freedom, and thus incontrovertibly incompatible with those international norms 
which affirm the individual’s right to freedom.60 To be sure, there do exist 
multiple international treaties61 and norms, which expressly forbid international 
abduction,62 and recently the U.N. General Assembly sponsored a global 
Convention on the topic of forced disappearance which was concluded on 
December 20, 2006.63 Forced disappearance, in fact,  
“places the persons subjected thereto outside the protection of the law and 
inflicts severe suffering on them and their families[; i]t constitutes a violation of 
[…] the right to recognition as a person before the law, the right to liberty and 
security of a person and the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.”64 
For these reasons, the reference to both the territorial State’s consent and 
the male captus rule as a way to maintain the legality of suspected terrorists’ 
                                                                                                                                  
“may not be object [of] measures of forece taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any 
ground whatever.” Ibid., at 277). 
59 See Bassiouni, supra note 29, noting that, present the asylum state’s consent, “such a 
practice would […] not disrupt relations between the respective states nor it would involve 
infringement of sovereignty. However, issues of human rights would remain”. Ibid., at p. 256. 
Again, also constitutional issues remain. 
60 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed on March 23, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 9(1) (“[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention” and 
“[n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty except of such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law.”) 
61 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9*, art. 7(1)(i). This is a norm of customary international law. See Antonio 
Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in ANTONIO CASSESE, PAOLA GAETA & JOHN R.W.D. 
JONES (EDS.), THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 353 
(2002), at p. 374; Paola Gaeta, Extraordinary Renditions and Immunity of State Agents from 
Criminal Jurisdiction [Extraordinary Renditions e immunità dalla giurisdizione penale degli 
agenti di Stati esteri: il caso Abu Omar], 89 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 126 (2006), 
p. 129. See also Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, signed on 
June 9, 1994 at Belem, Brazil, entered into force on March 28, 1996, OAS Doc. 
OEA/Ser.P/AG/Doc. 3114/94 (1994), reprinted in 33 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1529 (1994). 
See finally Reed Brody, Felipe Gonzales, Nunca Más: An Analysis of International Instruments 
on ‘Disappearances,’ 19 HUM. RTS Q. 365 (1997), at 376. 
62 See G.A. Res. 47/133, Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, preamble, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133, holding that “enforced disappearance 
undermines the deepest values of any society committed to respect for the rule of law, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and that the systematic practice of such acts os of the nature 
of a crime against humanity.” 
63 Moreover, on Dec. 20, 2006, 57 states signed the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177, which at 
art. 1 states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance”. Ibid., art. 1(1). 
Moreover, “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for 
enforced disappearance”. Ibid., art. 1(2). 
64 G.A. Res. 47/133, art. 1(2), supra note 62. 
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adbuctions are highly questionable in the ERP context. The male captus is 
perfectly adaptable to the violation of sovereignty, but it can hardly be applied 
to human rights violations, which were actually ignored by the cases cited 
above. Generally, it raises doubts from a moral viewpoint, since “[s]ociety is 
the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the guilty, it uses methods that lead 
to decreased respect for the law.”65 In conclusion, abduction is per se a 
violation of international law and, accordingly, Condoleezza Rice’s claim of the 
territorial state’s consent being sufficient grounds to show a respect for 
international law sounds extremely naïve. 
3.2. ASSESSING THE RISK OF TORTURE 
3.2.1. A VERY ABSOLUTE BAN 
The second component of the ERP, as mentioned earlier, is that the 
suspected terrorist is moved, for the purpose of interrogation, to a country that 
practices torture. Now, torture is unquestionably illegal under international 
law.66 Indeed, its ban is provided by a norm of jus cogens,67 making it 
inderogable and unjustifiable under all circumstances.68  
                                                 
65 Toscanino, supra note 58, at 274. 
66 See, for instance, U.N. Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment [CAT], adopted by the General Assembly by resolution 
39/46 of Dec. 10, 1984, art. 2, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force on June 26, 1987); 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR], 
signed in Rome on Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (into force since Sept. 3, 1953) 
(stating that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”); European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, signed on November 26, 1987, reprinted in 27 INT’L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 1152 (entered into force on February 1, 1989) (establishing a monitoring 
mechanism based on visit). 
67 See ICTY, IT-95-17/1, Prosecutor v. Furundzjia (Dec. 10, 1998), par. 153, 38 INT’L 
LEGAL MATERIALS 349 (1999) (emphasizing that “[b]ecause of the importance of the values 
[the principle proscribing torture] protects, this principle has evolved into a peremptory norm or 
jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty 
law and even ‘ordinary’ customary rules”). Usually norms of jus cogens prevail on all other 
norms of international law. See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed on May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 53 (“[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it 
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law”). Although the general principle 
is considering conflicting norms void, the solution found by the practice considers the norms of 
treaties which are inconsistent with jus cogens, simply unoperative or unenforceable. An 
example is given by treaties of extradition: the duty to extradite under a treaty cannot be 
enforced incompatibly with the prohibition of torture, even though the treaty still remains 
operative and enforceable. Erika De Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm 
of jus cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 97 
(2004), pp. 101-112. 
68 As to art. 3 of the ECHR, supra note 66, scholars note that “only in this article are 
there no qualifications or exceptions, and no restrictions to the rights guaranteed. The 
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The main problem with such a provision is that states must put forth their 
strongest efforts to prevent torture.69 Prevention is essential if human dignity is 
to be preserved at the global level. This assumption of the overriding priority of 
prevention of torture must deal with the problem of limited sovereignty of 
states. By this measure, states cannot extend their efforts to the territories of 
other countries. International law provides a solution for this problem by 
regulating the cases in which an individual, who is under the control of a state 
faces the risk of torture if moved to another state. In this regard, article 3(1) of 
the Convention against Torture (CAT),70 signed in 1984 under the U.N. General 
Assembly auspices, states that 
 
“[n]o state party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another state when there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture.”71 
 
This norm establishes that the authorities deciding on the transfer are 
obliged to refuse if there is a risk of torture in the country of destination. A 
question may arise about the meaning of the word “return,” in French 
“refouler.” While it is clear that the norm applies to expulsion and extradition 
proceedings, it seems to also contemplate the simple “turn[ing] back” of an 
immigrant.72 However, the term “refouler” –– which sparked animated debate 
during the CAT’s negotiations73 –– usually refers to the case of an individual 
who presents at the border, thus article 3(1) might not apply when the 
refoulement occurs on the territory of another country. Some scholars74 and 
                                                                                                                                  
prohibition is absolute.” CLARE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE (EDS.), JACOBS AND WHITE, THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (3d ed., 2002), at 58; likewise JOHN COOPER, 
CRUELTY. AN ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 3 (2003), at 9. In Chahal, the European Court of Human 
Rights [ECtHR] dealt with the deportation of a Sikh separatist from the United Kingdom to 
India, where he was threatened with torture. The British government argued that he was a 
dangerous terrorist and his expulsion was required for the security of English citizens. 
Interestingly, the Court pointed out that “even in these circumstances, the Convention prohibits 
in absolute terms torture.” Chahal v. United Kingdom, par. 80, (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 413 (dec. 
Nov. 15, 1996). See also Sœring v. United Kingdom, par. 88, (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439 (dec. July 
7, 1989). 
69 CAT, art. 2(1), supra note 66. 
70 Id. 
71 Ibid., art. 3(1). 
72 The proper translation of the French word “refouler” is “to force back, to push back, 
to turn back, […] to reject.” THE OXFORD-HACHETTE FRENCH DICTIONARY (3d ed., 2001), at 
719. 
73 See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, 
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (1988), p. 50, noticing that during 
negotiations “it was said that there were strong humanitarian reasons to include [the] word 
[‘return’ (‘refouler’)], which broadened the protection of the persons concerned.” 
74 See John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183 (2004), at p. 
1129 (“the [CAT] is generally inapplicable to transfers effected in the context of the current 
armed conflict because it has no extraterritorial effect (except in case of extradition) and, hence, 
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U.S. officials75 strongly believe that these doubts are well grounded, and that 
the CAT does not extend extraterritorially. In support of this argument, one of 
them proudly cites the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers 
Council of 1993.76 Their conclusion is that U.S. agents acting abroad have no 
restraints in transferring individuals to other countries, even when these 
individuals face the risk of being tortured. 
Before challenging this interpretation, we should recall article 3(2) of the 
CAT. While article 3(1) forbids the extradition, expulsion or deportation of a 
person only when there are “substantial grounds” to believe he or she would 
face torture,77 article 3(2) addresses the problem of determining when such a 
threshold is met, and provides that 
 
“[f]or the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent 
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where 
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant 
or mass violations of human rights.”78 
 
This norm apparently estabishes the conditions under which the 
“competent authorities” must decide when extradition, expulsion or deportation 
is to be considered forbidden. Precisely, it establishes, first, that all 
circumstances must be taken into account, meaning that “it is illegal to 
disregard any information about the likelihood of torture,”79 and, second, that 
between those circumstances there are gross violations of human rights 
perpetrated by the state concerned. Besides these indications, article 3(2) does 
not contain any other criteria as to how to assess the likelihood of torture with 
regard to extradition, expulsion or deportation proceedings. Nevertheless, some 
guidelines can be extrapolated from article 3(2). First, the individual does not 
have to prove that he or she would be subject to torture. It is enough for him or 
her to show that there are systematic violations of human rights in the 
destination state, because generally “where systematic violations of human 
rights take place, it is highly likely that torture takes place as well.”80 This is a 
                                                                                                                                  
cannot apply to Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners detained outside the U.S. territory”); John 
Radsan, supra note 11, p. 21 (assuming but not explaining that “CAT’s territorial reach is 
limited”). 
75 According to John Bellinger, “[t]he United States has long taken the position that [art. 
3 of the CAT] applies to people expelled or returned from the United States and we’re very 
careful about that obligation. It does not apply, though, to a transfer that takes place wholly 
outside of the United States, because that's not a return or an expulsion.” On-The-Record 
Briefing, supra note 194. 
76 Sale v. Haitian Center Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
77 CAT, art. 3(1). 
78 Ibid., art. 3(2). 
79 Hawkins, supra note 36, at 229.  
80 Matteo Fornari, La Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite contro la tortura e altre pene o 
trattamenti crudeli, inumani o degradanti, in LAURA PINESCHI (ED.), LA TUTELA 
INTERNAZIONALE DEI DIRITTI UMANI. NORME, GARANZIE, PRASSI 203 (2006), at 211 [translation 
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presumption in favor of the applicant.81 Second, for obvious reasons states 
normally refrain from expressly declaring their direct involvement in torture 
cases. Accordingly, it is unlikely that an applicant could find strong evidence of 
torture in the recipient country. It follows, hence, that the CAT does not require 
full proof of the truthfulness of the facts concerning torture.82 
I take the position that the standards provided by article 3 of the CAT 
apply to the ERP actions. First, I believe that the denial of the CAT’s 
extraterritorial reach is a product of a patent misunderstanding. As it has been 
correctly argued, if article 3 forbids certain transfers for regular proceedings, 
like expulsion or extradition, it must also a fortiori regulate also the irregular 
ones.83 As I pointed out above, article 3’s aim is to prevent torture: where the 
expulsion, extradition, or return proceedings are exhausted, the expelling state 
party will not be held responsible for the norm’s violation, and the individual, 
nevertheless, will have been tortured.84 As to Sale, it concerned article 33 of the 
U.N. Protocol on the status of refugees, a norm which is clearly distinct, with 
respect to its scope, from article 3 of the CAT.85 Moreover, in Furundzjia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has determined that 
the prohibition of torture as “an absolute value,”86 applies, regardless of 
jurisdictional issue, to all individuals on which states “wield authority.”87 The 
CAT, accordingly, applies extraterritorially to the extent to which States claim 
authority over an individual outside their territory. It would be a strange legal 
system that forbade questionable conduct in the most unconditional way and 
then permitted the same conduct on an extraterritorial exception!  
                                                                                                                                  
from Italian: “laddove si verifichino sistematiche violazioni dei diritti umani, [è] altamente 
probabile il compimento di atti di tortura”]. 
81 Id. 
82 Likewise Burgers & Danelius, supra note 73, p. 127. 
83 Precisely, “international human rights law is equally applicable to cases of 
expulsion/deportation as it is to regular extradition; it is arguably even more important in 
protecting individual rights in cases of irregular rendition.” Borelli, supra note 46, at 339. 
84 As remarked by the U.N. Committee Against Torture, “the main aim and purpose of 
the Convention is to prevent torture, and not to redress torture once it has occurred.” U.N. 
committee Against Torture, Communication 21/1995, Alan v. Switzerland, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/16/D/41/1996, par. 11.5.  
85 In fact, “the scope of the two provisions is different. In the Refugee Convention, 
protection is given to refugees, i.e. to persons who are persecuted in their coutry of origin for a 
special reason, whereas article 3 of the [CAT] applies to any person who, for whatever cause, is 
in danger of being sudjected to torture if handed over to another country.” J. Herman Burgers & 
Hans Danelius, supra note 73, p. 125. Note that the Authors refer to the Refugee Convention, 
whose art. 33 has the same formulation than art. 33 of the U.N. Protocol of the status of 
refugees.  
86 ICTY, Furundzjia, supra note 67, par. 154 (the ban of torture “signals to all members 
of the international community and the individuals over whom they wield authority that the 
prohibition of torture is an absolute value from which nobody must deviate.” Emphasis added). 
87 Ibid. Notice that the Tribunal could have said “individuals over whom they have 
jurisdiction:” clearly the meaning is to extend the prohibition of torture wherever the 
government could extend its control.  
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Second, as a matter of fact the recipient countries are always the same: 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Morocco, Pakistan, and, very recently, 
Ethiopia and Somalia.88 Most of them are not only notoriously involved in 
torture, for which they have been denounced by several U.S. government 
official reports,89 but also concerned in massive violations of human rights. 
Pursuant to article 3(2), one cannot see how the U.S. government could ignore 
the evidence of “substantial grounds” for the risk of torture in those countries. 
Clearly all the abducted individuals are under risk of torture if sent to the 
aforementioned countries, a fortiori under the notorious U.S. Senate 
interpretation of article 3(2) of the CAT, the so-called “more likely than not” 
standard.90 It seems very perplexing to maintain that the ERP does not involve 
torture on the part of the CIA agents who are responsible for specific 
abductions, and therefore lead to the international responsibility of the U.S..91 
3.2.2. CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS 
Another aspect that appears relevant to the present analysis is the 
relationship between the ERP and other international obligations concerning the 
fight against terrorism. We will address this issue from two viewpoints. First, 
we will determine whether the rendition remains a violation of international law 
even though the local authorities complied with certain other international legal 
obligations regarding the fight against terrorism; second, we will evaluate the 
                                                 
88 See Ethiopia Secret Prisons Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007. For a visual 
map of the CIA “black sites” and the countries involved therein, see the webpage available at 
the address  http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/0b/ExtRenditionMap.gif. 
89 See for instance U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, EGYPT, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS PRACTICE (2004), available online at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41720.htm, denouncing that “[t]he security forces 
continued to mistreat and torture prisoners,” and “[r]eports of torture and mistreatment at police 
stations remained frequent.” Ibid. 
90 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). 
91 In all the cases mentioned in this note, “the grounds for believing that someone will be 
tortured are close to 100%.” John Radsan, supra note 11, p. 19. It seems, however, that art. 3(2) 
of the CAT allows at least one case in which the violation of that norm could be excluded, that 
is when the State has not reasons to believe that the torture will take place because of the strong 
assurances given by the recipient State. In other words, diplomatic assurances might make the 
sender State reasonably believe that the individual concerned will not be tortured, and if then 
torture occurs, then the sender State could not be held responsible for that. This perspective 
seems highly problematic. Since the aim of CAT’s article 3 is to prevent torture, it seems 
unlikely that the State coud justify its conduct by using the diplomatic assurances from a 
country that is reported to commit gross violations of human rights. Of course, once the torture 
takes place, the sender State is forbidden to trust the diplomatic assurances in the future. Yet, 
what future do human rights have if all world States send at least one individual to Egypt under 
the latter’s diplomatic assurances? What is the sense of legitimating a legal framework which 
justifies systematic torture through diplomatic assurances but finding a very legal hole for 
torturing people? 
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persuasive authority of the argument that the ERP violates the norms on 
extradition of suspected terrorists. 
As to the first question, it was raised in the Agiza case, decided in 2005 
by the Committee Against Torture. The Committee was seized by Agiza, a 
terrorist rendered by SÄPO to Egypt in 2001 on a CIA flight.92 Sweden argued 
that the action should have been considered a part of its national efforts to 
comply with the obligations deriving from the U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001).93 In particular, the government emphasized that, 
according to Resolution 1373, states must prevent the institution of asylum 
from being exploited by terrorists.94 The Committe responded by expressly 
acknowledging that, although  
“measures taken to fight terrorism, including denial of safe haven, deriving from 
binding Security Council Resolutions are both legitimate and important […, 
t]heir execution, however, must be carried out with full respect to the applicable 
rules of international law, including the provisions of the [CAT].”95  
Stated differently, even if formally speaking Security Council resolutions 
are deemed to prevail over all other international obligations according to 
article 103 of the U.N. Charter,96 the ban on torture established by the CAT is 
so strong that U.N. norms prevalence may not be invoked when the risk of 
torture is at stake.97 
On this aspect, the explanation lies in the hierarchy of international law. 
While on the one hand a treaty on cooperation or extradition could be overruled 
by a subsequent agreement concluded by the intelligence agencies of the 
concerned countries as to the rendition of a particular individual,98 norms of jus 
                                                 
92 U.N. Committee against Torture, Communication 233/03, Agiza v. Sweden, 
CAT/C/34/D/233/3002 (May 20, 2005), available online at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts 
/cat/decisions/233-2003.html. 
93 S.C. Res. 1373 (2001), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
94 Agiza, supra note 92, par. 4.9 (noting that Resolution 1373 “called upon Member 
States to ensure, in accordance with international law, that the institution of refugee status is not 
abused by perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts”). 
95 Ibid., par 13.1. 
96 U.N. Charter art. 103 (“[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”). 
97 I do not deal with the very controversial issue of balancing human rights obligations 
with the U.N. framework of resolutions concerning the fight against terrorism. 
98 I basically agree with Professor Bassiouni, when he argues that in presence of 
rendition accidents, “[t]he solution […] should be to make extradition more efficient, not to 
subvert it by resorting to unlawful or legally questionable means.” M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra 
note 29, p. 251. However, in our view this is a political problem. Legally speaking, there is no 
issue for a state party to an extradition treaty to derogate to it with the consent of the other state 
party. A different solution would be settled in case the territorial state did not consent to the 
operation. Here, in fact, absent the approval of the territorial state, no legal agreement could be 
construed as to supercede the previous one, that remains obviously valid and in respect of 
which the abduction is clearly a breach. 
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cogens cannot be derogated by the states, since they are imperative. The rights 
affirmed thereby are not negotiable; thus states cannot exploit the consent of 
those rights in order to justify a violation of the jus cogens. Moreover, as to the 
argument that Resolution 1373 justifies such actions, this appears very 
reductive. Not only does Resolution 1373 not authorize states to kidnap 
individuals and torture them, but it would be dishonest to interpret its norms as 
a justification for violating the jus cogens provision contained in article 3 of the 
CAT.99 
As to the second question (whether ERP violates the norms on 
extradition), one should wonder what is so problematic in developing a system 
parallel to extradition. Why should the ERP not be intended as a means of 
rendition that is “alternative” to the one provided by extradition treaties? The 
answer is very simple: “[e]xtralegal remedies to extradition […] invariably 
pose a threat to international peace and security.”100 Of course, not all the 
remedies held outside the framework of a treaty are automatically illegal. For 
instance, some could be justified as countermeasures, although this argument 
could hardly be bought.101 However, they are illegal if they are inconsistent 
with the treaty provisions, i.e. they are “contrary to the treaty right[s] of 
another state.”102 Clearly, where extradition treaties require a minimum 
standard of treatment for the detainee or any substantial or procedural guarantee 
                                                 
99 See European Court of First Instance [CFI], case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf, Al 
Barakaat Int’l Found’n v. Council and Commission (Sept. 21, 2005), para. 278-280, [2005] 
E.C.R. II-3533, app’d under case C-415/05, [2006] OJ C48, 11; case T-315/01, Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission (Sept. 21, 2005), para. 227-230, [2005] E.C.R. II-
3649, app’d under case C-402/05, [2006] OJ C36, 19. 
100 BARBARA M. YARNOLD, INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVES. A NEW ROLE FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1991), p. 69, stating that “[e]xtralegal methods of extradition 
may also endanger the national and international rights of criminal defendants.” Ibid., at p. 70. 
101 Under international law, countermeasures are reactions (or, juridically speaking, 
“legitimate reprisals”) brought by a State which had been harmed by another State’s conduct. 
Generally, if brought out of the requirements established by international law, countermeasures 
are illegal. One of these requirements is that countermeasure must be “taken in response to a 
previous international wrongful act of another State and […] directed against that State.” 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), [1997] I.C.J. Rep. 7, par. 83. Those 
limits explain why international law cannot be called to justify aliens’ abductions. First, one 
should determine which norm had been previously breached. This could not be the norm on 
cooperation against terrorism, or the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, because usually the 
States in whose territory the alleged terrorists are kidnapped are cooperative countries (e.g. 
Italy, Sweden, Pakistan, and Bosnia-Herzegovina), indeed in some of those criminal 
proceedings were already ongoing (for instance, in Abu Omar and Boumediene). Second, 
“[c]ountermeasures shall not affect […] obligations for the protection of fundamental human 
rights.” Draft of Articles, art. 50(1)(a), supra note 40. Clearly, such countermeasures would 
heavily affect the individual right to be free from arbitrary detention. Third, before taking 
countermeasures the States must fulfill some obligations, such as the request of negotiations 
and the call for halting the violation, something that hardly happened in the ERP cases. Ibid., 
art. 52(1). For all these reasons, barely ERP actions could be justified as countermeasures under 
international law. 
102 Crawford, supra note 43, at 83, related to Draft of Articles, art. 2, supra note 40. 
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for the extradition proceedings, abductions constitute a breach of these 
norms.103 In the Court’s dissenting opinion in Alvarez-Machain, Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and O’Connor, correctly stressed that  
 
“[t]he Government’s claim that the Treaty is not exclusive, but permits forcible 
governmental kidnaping, would transform these, and other, provisions into little 
more than verbiage. [… Indeed, i]t is shocking that a party to an extradition treaty 
might believe that it has secretly reserved the right to make seizures of citizens in 
the other party’s territory.”104 
 
In Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. government claimed that the extradition 
treaty between the United States and Mexico was not exclusive, but that 
extradition was only an “optional method of obtaining jurisdiction over alleged 
offenders.”105 Although the majority agreed with this perspective, its viewpoint 
was wrong. States go to the effort of negotiating and stipulating complex 
international treaties in order to set a legal framework for their cooperation. 
When they assess a duty to extradite, they do so because the territorial state’s 
consent is essential to the continued peaceful cohabitation of sovereign entities. 
If states could freely kidnap people everywhere, why should they stipulate 
hundred of treaties on extradition and cooperation in criminal matters? The 
extradition processes might be time-consuming, but are nevertheless efficient, 
because while abductions are by definition life threatening and inhumane, 
“extradition[s] have yet to kill anyone.”106 Significantly, after 9/11 the Security 
Council has strengthened its action against terrorism not by legitimizing other 
techniques of capture of suspected terrorists, but calling upon states to 
cooperate strongly.107  
In conclusion, “[t]he integrity of the internationally recognized process of 
extradition should not be subverted for pratical considerations[, and] 
alternative devices to extradition should not be allowed.”108 The presumption 
that ERP saves lives is highly questionable: unlike the extradition processes, the 
ERP seems to deeply affect the human dignity, to undermine international 
                                                 
103 Likewise, Nicoletta Parisi, Brief Remarks on Judicial Co-Operation in Criminal 
Matters and the Rights of Individuals in the Light of International and Domestic Praxis, in 3 
STUDI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE IN ONORE DI GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ 2081 (2004), p. 
2103. 
104 Alvarez-Machain, supra note 51, at 679. 
105 Ibid., at 674. 
106 GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHANISMS (1998), p. 361. 
107 See S.C. Res. 1373 (2001), § 2(f) (“assistance) and 3(b), (c), (e) (“cooperat[ion]”), 
supra note 93. See also Silvia Borelli, supra note 46, p. 363 (“[i]nternational cooperation is 
therefore […] a viable alternative to abduction”). 
108 M. Cherif Bassiouni, supra note 29, p. 311. Likewise Satyadeva Bedi, Extradition: A 
Treatise on the Laws Relevant to the Fugitive Offenders Within and With the Commonwealth 
Countries (2002), p. 396. Geoff Gilbert, supra note 106, at pp. 375-377, instead, proposes a 
framework of new rules on abduction, regulated by a treaty, whose violation would divest 
domestic courts of jurisdiction.  
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relations and to challenge the government supremacy in foreign policy, as we 
will see shortly. 
4. HOW THE ERP IS UNDERMINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
4.1. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COURTS 
Traditionally, domestic courts have little room to question the 
government’s maneuvers in its relations with other states. However, the ERP 
has broken with this classical picture of domestic constitutional structure. Since 
in most constitutional systems the foreign policy remains a strict competence of 
the Executive Branch – of course, with some interventions by the Parliament – 
the courts’ interference with ERP cases is likely to raise serious questions on 
domestic relations with the United States. I will proceed with several examples. 
First, consider the Abu Omar case. Apparently, the CIA agents acted with 
the placet of the Italian secret service, the SISMI. Some SISMI members, 
including a director, were indicted for the abduction.109 The government 
strongly opposed to any declassification of the information related to the 
accident. However, on February 17, 2007, the judge for the preliminary hearing 
of Milan decided that the state secret defense was untenable, and that the trial 
must go forth. The government appealed to the Constitutional Court,110 but the 
prospect of lifting the veil from the “CIA-SISMI joint venture” would clearly 
be embarassing to its relations with the United States. Furthermore, while the 
Italian code of criminal procedure provides for the trial in absentia, the arrest 
warrant issued by the Milan Court is valid throughout the entire European 
Union, pursuant to the so-called “European arrest warrant” approved in 2002.111 
                                                 
109 Ex-Intelligence Chief, CIA Agents Indicted for Kidnapping, CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 
Feb. 17, 2007 [translation in English in Watching America, available at 
http://www.watchingamerica.com/corriere dellasera000021.shtml]. 
110 In particular, art. 134 of the Italian Constitution vests the Constitutional Court of the 
jurisdiction over disputes arisen between powers. In Abu Omar, the dispute involved the powers 
of the government in the availability of state secret defense with regard to certain actions, and 
the courts’ powers to indict state and foreign officials for criminal conducts sanctioned by the 
law. It is unlikely that the government advances a formal request to the U.S. government for the 
extradition of the CIA agents involved in Abu Omar’s abduction, at least until the 
Constitutional Court would not have rendered its decision. See Ian Fisher, Italians Indict C.I.A. 
Operatives in ’03 Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at A1. 
111 See Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, 2002/584/JHA, June 13, 2002, OJ L 190/1 (July 18, 2002), 
art. 1(1), 1(2). 
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Second, in El-Masri, both the Federal District Court of East Virginia112 
and the Court of Appeals113 dismissed the case on the grounds of the doctrine of 
state secret. According to U.S. courts, the ERP must remain secret because the 
interests of U.S. national security so require. Nevertheless, the German 
authorities initiated investigations about El-Masri’s abduction.114 In late 
January, 2007, a criminal court in Münich issued an arrest warrant against some 
CIA agents supposedly involved in the incident.115 Apparently, the airport of 
Frankfurt and the U.S. base at Ramstein have been used for flights concerning 
the ERP.116 Like the Italian one, the German arrest warrant is valid for all 
European prosecutors.117 
Third, in Arar, the Canadian policy against terrorism received a strong 
and polemical rebuff by an ad hoc Commission, elected by the legislature and 
presided over by Justice Dennis O’Connor (“O’Connor Commission”).118 The 
O’Connor Commission was required to inquire on the factual circumstances in 
which Arar’s deportation to Syria had occurred, and to recommend the potential 
reforms of the Canadian security services. The Commission issued four 
reports119 where it recommended, among other things: the rigorous separation 
of the intelligence agencies from those of law-enforcement, like the RMCP;120 a 
strengthening of the cooperation and information-sharing process between the 
two entities;121 and, finally, the introduction of “clearly established policies 
respecting screening for relevance, reliability and accuracy and with relevant 
laws respecting personal information and human rights.”122 These policies, 
                                                 
112 Khaled El-Masri v. George Tenet et al., 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), at 537 
(“any admission or denial [...] in this case would reveal the means and methods employed 
pursuant to this clandestine program and such revelation would present a grave risk of injury to 
national security”), and 539 (“any answer to the complaint by the defendants risks the 
disclosure of specific details about the rendition argument”). 
113 Khaled El-Masri v. United States et al., 2007 WL 625130 (C.A.4 (Va.)). 
114 One should remind that el-Masri is a German citizen. 
115 See Mark Lander, German Court Confronts U.S. On Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 
2007, at A1. 
116 Ibid. 
117 See supra note 111. 
118 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar [O’Connor Commission], established on Feb. 5, 2004, all information available at 
http://www.ararcommission.ca. 
119 The Commission decided Arar under two perspective. As to the facts amounting to 
the investigation, the Commission issued three Reports, one on Analysis and Recommendations, 
and two on the Arar’s abduction Factual Background. See O’CONNOR COMMISSION, FACTUAL 
INQUIRY (2006), available at http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/26.htm. The last Report, 
published on Dec. 12, 2006, concludes with a series of recommendation to the RCMP. 
O’CONNOR COMMISSION, A NEW REVIEW MECHANISM FOR THE RCMP’S NATIONAL SECURITY 
ACTIVITIES (2006), downloadable at http://www.arar commission.ca/eng/EnglishReportDec12 
2006.pdf. 
120 Factual Inquiry, supra note 119, pp. 312-316 (recommendation 1). 
121 Ibid., pp. 316-322 (recommendation 2). 
122 Ibid., p. 334 (recommendation 8). 
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subsequently outlined in the fourth Report,123 must be attached as a caveat to 
any information shared with foreign agencies and, most importantly, if foreign 
agencies made “improper use” of the information provided by Canadian 
agencies, “a formal objection should be made to the foreign agency and the 
foreign minister of the recipient country.”124 According to the Commission, any 
information screening criterion should attain a human rights standard that 
refuses to consider as reliable any information provided by foreign agencies 
with questionable human rights policies. The clear aim of these 
recommendations is to prevent Canadian agencies from using information 
obtained by torture or human rights abuses.125 The O’Connor Commission’s 
findings triggered a negative public reaction that convinced the government to 
publicly acknowledge, by formal apology, the RMCP’s mistakes in Arar and to 
award the victim 10 million dollars’ compensation for the damages incurred as 
a result of the RMCP misinformation.126 Although the American Arar Court 
still maintained that “the need for much secrecy can hardly be doubted,”127 thus 
defending the secrecy of the ERP, Canada decided to inform the public of the 
governmental agencies’ questionable behavior and to conduct a complete 
investigation on the relevant facts and remedies of the case. A formal protest to 
Condoleezza Rice from the Canadian Prime Minister also followed.128 
Finally, the Boumediene case is worthy of mention. In October 2001, the 
police of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina arrested Lakhdar Boumediene 
and five other people (“the Algerian Six”) on the charge of having planned an 
assault on the U.S. and British embassies in Sarajevo. Among them, five had 
obtained the Bosnian citizenship and one was a resident under permission. On 
January 17, 2002, the investigatory judge of the Supreme Court ordered their 
release because of a lack of grounds for further detention; that afternoon, the 
order was delivered to the prison; that evening, the Chamber of Human Rights 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (CHR) issued an interim order to prevent the detainees’ 
                                                 
123 A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP’s National Security Activities, supra note 
119. 
124 Factual Inquiry, supra note 119, p. 344 (recommendation 12). 
125 Ibid., p. 348 (recommendation 15) (holding that “Canadian agencies must exercise 
care in agreeing to receive information from countries with questionable human rights records. 
It is important that, in doing so, they not appear to encourage or in any way condone abuse of 
human rights or the use of torture”). 
126 See Prime Minister Announces $10.5-Million Compensation for Maher Arar, 
CANADIAN PRESS, Jan. 26, 2007. 
127 Maher Arar v. John Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), at 281. For a 
criticism, see Michael V. Sage, The Exploitation of Legal Loopholes in the Name of National 
Security: A Case Study on Extraordinary Rendition, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 121 (2006), at p. 
129. 
128 See Meagan Fitzpartick, Ottawa Launching “Formal Protest”over U.S. Treatment of 
Maher Arar, NAT’L POST, Oct. 6, 2006; ‘Come Clean’ on Arar, Harper Asks U.S., CBCNEWS, 
Oct. 6, 2006. 
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transfer.129 Nevertheless, late at night the police handed over the prisoners and 
immediately transferred them to the NATO Stabilization Force. In late January, 
the U.S. government declared that they were held in Guantanamo.130 On 
October 12, 2002, the CHR decided that “the Algerian Six” had been removed 
illegally and that the Bosnian government had violated the ECHR.131 
Subsequently, it ordered the state and federal governments to take measures to 
counteract the violations, such as the annulment of the removal order.132 The 
fact that the Bosnian government had disregarded two different orders from 
domestic courts obviously exacerbated the conflict between powers. Precisely, 
the CHR instructed the government “to use all diplomatic channels in order to 
protect the basic rights of the applicants […], taking all possible steps to 
establish contacts with the applicants and to provide them with consular 
support,”133 and “to prevent the death penalty from being pronounced against 
and executed on the applicants.”134 The conflict involved not only the Judiciary 
and the Executive branches, but also the legislature, since on May 11, 2004 the 
Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina had participated in the conclusions of the 
CHR,135 and indeed in 2005 had required the government to urge the U.S. 
Administration to release the Bosnian detainees held at Guantanamo.136 Finally, 
the Boumediene counsels filed a petition before the European Court of Human 
Rights, utilizing the CHR decision of 2002 to argue that Bosnia-Herzegovina 
breached the European Convention of Human Rights.137 
                                                 
129 The interim order had been requested by the detainees themselves, who feared to be 
sent to Algeria, their original home country, and be tortured there. 
130 Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Unlawful Detention of Six Men from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in Guantanamo Bay, AI Index EUR 63/013/2003 (May 30, 2003). 
131 The ECHR is in force to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to the 
Dayton Agreement, whose article I incorporates the Convention. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
Constitution was set under the Dayton Agreements, signed by Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
the Federal Republic of Jugoslavia on Dec. 14, 1995. At art. VII, the Dayton Agreements 
establish that the Parties recognize the “observance of human rights” as set forth in the Annex 
6, which contains the relevant provisions regarding human rights in the Republic. Chapter I of 
the Annex 6 lists the fundamental rights that the Republic abides to respect, and Chapter II 
structure the Commission of Human Rights, cited in the following notes. 
132 Precisely, the Chamber of Human Rights of Bosnia-Herzegovina [CHR] addressed 
the government the following violations of the ECHR: art. 1 of the Protocol 7 (right not to be 
arbitrarily expelled); art. 5(1) (right to liberty and security); art. 6(2) (right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty); art. 1 of Protocol 6 to the ECHR (right of not to be subjected to 
death penalty). See James Sloan, Dayton Peace Agreements: Human Rights Guarantees and 
Their Implementation, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 207 (1996), 209. 
133 CHR, In re Lakhdar Boumediene, Decision, Oct. 11, 2002, pt. 15, published as an 
annex in the petition in front of the ECHR, Lakhdar Boumediene v. Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (hereinafter, “Boumediene Petition”), available online at http://www.statewatch. 
org/rendition/rendition.html, sub docc. 198-99 (“Part I & II – Boumediene Petition to the 
European Court of Human Rights”). 
134 Id., pt. 16. 
135 See Boumediene Petition, supra note 133, at p. 12. 
136 Id, at p. 14. 
137 Id., p. 28 ff. 
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What may be inferred from these examples is, first, that a nation’s foreign 
policy is no longer the strict prerogative of the Executive branch or the 
Parliament. Although this is a very domestic constitutional issue, it triggers 
relevant political effects at the international level. By incriminating U.S. 
citizens who were acting in their official capacity, courts are embarassing their 
own governments in their already delicate relations with the U.S. Indeed, their 
questioning stands to raise serious doubts about the correctness of the 
government’s behavior, especially in the eyes of the public; it destabilizes its 
efforts in the global war on terror public debate, and even potentially 
delegitimizes the government itself.  
Moreover, one should consider the international implications of the 
courts’ intervention. For instance, concerning the Italian and German officials’ 
involvement in the ERP, the arrest warrants against the CIA agents extend 
throughout the entire European Union, thus it automatically concerns the 
criminal courts in all of Europe. This can raise very significant political issues 
for all states in the EU, not only those whose courts had issued the initial 
mandate, as to the relations between the local secret services and the CIA. 
In addition, one should wonder why national governments vigorously 
insist on protecting their involvement in ERP actions through the secrecy 
defense. Since this seems to be a common trend in European countries and the 
United States, it is natural to ask whether a new “transnational concept of State 
secrecy” is going to arise from judicial disputes concerning the ERP. Besides 
the strict constitutional aspects of State secrecy, the defense is usually justified, 
in the government’s view, by reasons of national security. But since ERP 
actions “took place with the requisite permissions, protections, or active 
assistance of government agencies,”138 it is likely that among the national 
security’s reasons, the protection of alliance with and reliance by the U.S. plays 
a significant role.139 Clearly this results in a concealment of some aspects of 
international relations from democratic scrutiny, and generally in a lack of 
accountability. 
In conclusion, all these episodes demonstrate that, even though the 
conflict seems to impact the domestic legal order nearly exclusively, the trend 
of refusing the ERP at the international level must be considered, to date, to be 
the dominant one. 
4.2. THE EUROPEAN STRUGGLE: HARD REACTIONS AGAINST BLIND EYES 
4.2.1. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE: BLIND EYES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
                                                 
138 Marty’s Committee Second Report, supra note 31, par. 10. 
139 In fact, “[i]n Italy, as in Germany, irrespective of the alternation in political power 
between parties, the same line has apparently been chosen, namely the preservation at any price 
of relations (and especially of interests) with the powerful ally, with “state secrecy” being 
invoked whenever an unpleasant truth might become public.” Ibid., at par. 323. 
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The Council of Europe (COE), a political organization with a broader 
membership than the EU, intervened against the ERP action that took place on 
the territories of its Member States. In 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
COE elected an investigation committee presided over by the Swiss Senator 
Dick Marty (“Marty’s Committee”),140 while the Secretary-General sent a 
questionnaire to the governments of the member states about the existence of 
secret CIA detention facilities on their territories.141 Meanwhile, the 
Parliamentary Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law, well-known as the “Venice 
Commission,” on the legality of secret detention with regard to states’ 
obligations under the ECHR. 
On March 1, 2006, the Secretary-General published a first Report on 
states’ responses.142 The Report focuses on three aspects of the ECHR 
enforcement: effective domestic laws to sanction the Convention’s breaches, 
omissions in the enforcement of the ECHR, and, finally, significant controls on 
the air traffic within their jurisdiction.143 Interestingly, the Report states that 
                                                 
140 Nov. 1, 2005. 
141 The Secretary-General of the COE, in fact, is empowered to request “any High 
Contracting Party [… to] furnish an explanation of the manner in which its internal law ensures 
the effective implementation of any of the provisions of th[e ECHR].” ECHR, supra note 66, 
art. 52. 
142 COE, Secretary General’s Report under Article 52 ECHR on the question of secret 
detention and transport of detainees suspected of terrorist acts, notably by or at the instigation 
of foreign agencies, SG/Inf (2006) 5 (Feb. 28, 2006). 
143 Ibid., par. 20, 22-23 (“[s]uch renditions involve multiple human rights violations, 
including transfer in breach of the principle of non-refoulement, as well as arbitrary arrest and 
incommunicado detention. The victim is placed in a situation of complete defencelessness with 
no judicial control or oversight by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
leaving the door open for the use of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. According to the 
Court, the unacknowledged detention of an individual is a complete negation of the 
Convention’s guarantees against arbitrary deprivation of liberty and a most grave violation of 
Article 5 (right to liberty and security) [citing Kurt v. Turkey, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 373 (May 25, 
1998), §§ 123-124] The arbitrary arrest, detention and transfer of an individual would also 
affect the rights under Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life), Article 13 (right to 
an effective remedy) and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (freedom of movement), as well as, 
depending on the circumstances, Article 2 (right to life) and Article 3 (prohibition of torture). 
[…] The activities of foreign agencies cannot be attributed directly to States Parties. Their 
responsibility may nevertheless be engaged on account of either their duty to refrain from aid or 
assistance in the commission of wrongful conduct, acquiescence and connivance in such 
conduct, or, more generally, their positive obligations under the Convention. In accordance with 
the generally recognised rules on State responsibility, States may be held responsible of aiding 
or assisting another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. There can be 
little doubt that aid and assistance by agents of a State Party in the commission of human rights 
abuses by agents of another State acting within the former’s jurisdiction would constitute a 
violation of the Convention. Even acquiescence and connivance of the authorities in the acts of 
foreign agents affecting Convention rights might engage the State Party’s responsibility under 
the Convention. Of course, any such vicarious responsibility presupposes that the authorities of 
States Parties had knowledge of the said activities”). 
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some responses were incomplete or extremely generic.144 Moreover, although 
some states provide a regulatory framework for the activities of foreign agents 
on their territories, generally the parliamentary or judicial controls on these 
activities are limited in several ways,145 and most actions of foreign officials are 
protected by the foreign agents’ immunity exception.146 Indeed, the restraints 
on flights in domestic air space have been surprisingly ineffective; thus, any 
foreign airplane could engage in illegal activities, such as those carried out by 
the ERP, in several member states without difficulty.147 Intriguingly, according 
to the Report, some states clearly dissimulated their own roles in specific ERP 
actions. For instance, the Italian government denied any involvement of its 
public officials in “flying prisons” –– words whose meaning still remains 
obscure –– notwithstanding the ongoing criminal proceedings in Milan;148 
similarly, the Republic of Macedonia did not respond to the question of 
involvement,149 nor did Bosnia-Herzegovina.150 It seems obvious from these 
reactions that the questions posed by the Secretary-General were disconcerting 
to these governments, already enmired in court battles at home. The 
insufficiency or incompleteness of their answers is a clear signal, in the view of 
the COE Secretary-General, that the ECHR needs a more powerful enforcement 
framework to deal with illegal actions like those of the ERP.151 On April 12, 
2006, the Secretary-General held a press conference, and concluded that  
“virtually none of our member states have proper legislative and administrative 
measures to effectively protect individuals against violations of human rights 
committed by agents of friendly foreign security services operating on their 
territory”.152 
The Marty’s Committee published two Reports, respectively in 2006 and 
2007.153 The First Report affirms that  
                                                 
144 Ibid., para. 17-19. 
145 Ibid., par. 41. 
146 Ibid., para. 70-71 (citing the international jurisprudence that face the problem of 
immunity of foreign agents with regard to violations of human rights).  
147 Ibid., para. 54-55. 
148 Ibid., par. 91 (noting that “[g]iving only a partial reply to the question about 
involvement and not replying at all to the question about official investigations, Italy has failed 
to provide information about the well-known ongoing criminal investigation into the alleged 
abduction of Abu Omar by CIA agents in Italy, in contrast to Germany and Switzerland which 
provide information about ongoing investigations by their own authorities”). 
149 Ibid., par. 90. 
150 Id.  
151 See the Secretary-General’s conclusions in Ibid., par. 101.  
152 Speaking Notes for the Press Conference of Terry Davis, Secretary-General of the 
COE (Apr. 12, 2006), available on the Internet at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/PA-
Sessions/April-2006/2006 0412_Speaking-notes_sg.asp. 
153 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Report on Alleged Secret Detention 
and Unlawful Inter-state Transfer of Detainees Involving COE Member States, Doc. no. 10957 
(June 12, 2006) (hereinafter, “Marty’s Committee First Report), available online at 
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“the CIA ‘rendition’ programme has revealed a network that resembles a 
‘spider’s web’ spun across the globe [which entails] human rights violations – 
some of which continue – and […] the responsibilities of some [COE] Member 
states […, and] it is only through the intentional or grossly negligent collusion of 
the European partners that this ‘web’ was able to spread also over Europe.”154  
According to the Committee,  
“across the world, the United States has progressively woven a clandestine 
‘spider’s web’ of disappearances, secret detentions and unlawful inter-state 
transfers, often encompassing countries notorious for their use of torture[, and 
h]undreds of persons have become entrapped in this web, in some cases merely 
suspected of sympathising with a presumed terrorist organization.”155  
As we can see, the Committee repeatedly emphasizes the illegality of the 
ERP actions and the inadequate governmental response. First, as to the state 
secret defense, the Committee urges that secret agencies’ actions be brought 
under the scrutiny of the national Parliaments or the Judicial branches.156 
Second, it addresses strong recommendations not only to member states, but 
significantly, also to the United States, to report the rendition of suspected 
terrorists under the rule of law.157 Third, it makes a point of really appreciating 
the work done by public prosecutors158 and parliamentary inquiry 
commissions159 to ascertain the violations of human rights which occurred in 
relation to specific ERP actions, such as Abu Omar160 and El-Masri.161 The 
                                                                                                                                  
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc06/edoc10957.pdf. See also che 
Committee’s Second Report, mentioned supra note 31. 
154 Ibid., p. 1, and par. 280 at p. 59. 
155 Ibid., par. 5, at p. 2. 
156 Ibid., par. 12, at p. 3 (where “[t]he Assembly takes the view that neither national 
security nor state secrecy can be invoked in such a sweeping, systematic fashion as to shield 
these unlawful operations from robust parliamentary and judicial scrutiny”). 
157 United States has the status of an observer of the COE. The Committee is particularly 
shrewd on this point, expressly challenging the position taken by the U.S. Administration and 
proposing an alternative framework for the ERP. It states, in fact, that “[t]he American 
administration states that rendition is a vital tool in the fight against international terrorism. We 
consider that renditions may be acceptable, and indeed desirable, only if they satisfy a number 
of very specific requirements (which, with a few exceptions, has not been the case in any of the 
known renditions to date). If a state is unable, or does not wish, to prosecute a suspect, it should 
be possible to apply the following principle: no person genuinely suspected of a serious act of 
terrorism should feel safe anywhere in the world. In such cases, however, the person in question 
may be handed over only to a state able to provide all the guarantees of a fair trial, or – even 
better – to an international jurisdiction, which in my view should be established as a matter of 
urgency.” Ibid., par. 261, at p. 53. 
158 Ibid., para. 237-245, at pp. 49-50. 
159 Ibid., para. 246-253, at pp. 50-51. 
160 See Ibid., par. 237, at p. 49, where the Marty Commitee points out that “the Italian 
judicial authorities and police have shown great competence and remarkable independence in 
the face of political pressures.” 
161 Ibid., par. 238, at p. 49. 
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Committee concluded that some member states were responsible for the ERP, 
some of them turned a blind eye to the CIA actions on their territories, some 
simply ignored them and others deliberately refused to know.162 
Interestingly, the Marty’s Committee directly challenged the position 
taken by the United States, evidenced by the meeting held by the U.S. delegate, 
John Bellinger, before the U.N. Committee Against Torture in May, 2006. The 
Marty Committee pointed out that “the United States does not see itself bound 
to satisfy anyone’s interpretation of international law but its own,”163 and that 
“[t]he United States’ formalistic and positivist approach shocks the legal 
sensibilities of Europeans, who are rather influenced by ‘teleological’ 
considerations. In other words, the European approach is to opt for an 
interpretation that affords maximum protection to the values on which the legal 
rule is based.”164 As far as we are concerned, this is the first time that a 
democratic assembly of an international organization addresses such a strong 
message to the government of the United States about the interpretation of 
international law. Clearly, this statement reveals the concern that an entire 
framework of human rights, the European one, would be disregarded for being 
too protective of individual rights (sic!). More importantly, the Marty 
Committee and the subsequent resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly 
struggle over the legality of the ERP and attempt to bring its legal analysis of 
what was initially a purely foreign policy matter to a deeper confrontation with 
public opinion, courts and democratic inquiry commissions. 
A purely legal approach to the problem of the ERP has been undertaken 
by the Venice Commission in the Opinion published on March 22, 2006.165 The 
Commission dealt with three issues: the problem of regular v. irregular inter-
state transfers of prisoners, the violations of human rights caused by the latter, 
and the specific COE members obligations under the ECHR. First, the 
Commission pointed out that every transfer of individuals besides the “four 
situations in which a State may lawfully transfer a prisoner to another state,”166 
i.e., deportation, extradition, transit and transfer, is undisputedly irregular.167 
Irregularity is, hence, linked to actions out of the conventional framework, and 
by implication, out of the law. 
With regard to the second aspect (human rights violations), the ERP 
impacts both the human rights established by the ECHR, in particular the right 
                                                 
162 Ibid., par. 285, at p. 59. See also Geoff Meade, Britain Named for Colluding in US 
Rendition Flights, THE INDEPENDENT, June 7, 2006. 
163 Ibid., par. 271, at p. 54. 
164 Ibid., par. 272, at p. 54. 
165 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion 
on the International Legal Obligations of COE Member States in Respect of Secret Detention 
Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, No. 363/2005, CDL-AD(2006)009, (March 17, 
2006), available online at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-AD(2006)009-e.asp. 
166 Ibid., par. 10. 
167 Ibid., para. 24-29. 
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to liberty and security under article 5(1) of the ECHR,168 and the prohibition of 
torture under the jus cogens, including the obligation to investigate every case 
of torture which has arisen by circumstance.169  
Finally, as to the obligations by which the members of the COE currently 
abide, the Commission clarifies that  
“[a]ny arrest of a person by foreign authorities on the territory of a [COE] 
member State without the agreement of this member State is a violation of its 
sovereignty and is therefore contrary to international law [, and it] also affects 
that person’s individual right  to security under Article 5 § 1 [of the ECHR].”170  
Indeed, where the concerned government consented to the rendition, “the 
question of governmental control over the security/police services, and […] of 
parliamentary control over the government”171 may arise. In the Commission’s 
view, this situation signifies more than a simple political problem, since “[t]he 
Statute of the [COE] and the ECHR require respect for the rule of law which in 
turn requires accountability for all exercises of public power.”172 Moreover, 
                                                 
168 ECHR, art. 5(1), supra note 66. The Venice Commission emphasizes, in this respect, 
that “[t]he possible reasons for detention are exhaustively enumerated in Article 5 (1) ECHR. 
Paragraph 1(c) of Article 5 permits ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the 
purpose of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to 
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so’, while paragraph (f) of 
Article 5 permits ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a 
view to deportation or extradition.’ A detention for any reason other than those listed in Article 
5 § 1 is unlawful and thus a violation of a human right” (emphasis added). Venice Commission, 
Opinion, supra note 165, par. 50. The Commission also notes that “Article 5 must be seen as 
requiring the authorities of the territorial State to take effective measures to safeguard against 
the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into a substantiated 
claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since [citing Kurt v. 
Turkey, supra note 143, § 124].” Ibid., par. 53. 
169 Specifically, “Member States of the ECHR not only have the obligation not to torture 
but also the duty to prevent torture.[28] In addition they have an obligation of investigation. 
Under this obligation Member States must assure an efficient, effective and impartial 
investigation. As soon as the authorities receive substantiated information giving rise to the 
suspicion that torture or inhuman or degrading treatment has been committed, a duty to 
investigate arises whether and in which circumstances torture has been committed.” Ibid., par. 
61. See also CAT, art. 4 and 9, supra note 69. 
170 Ibid., par. 116, citing Stocké v. Germany, A/199 (1990), Oct. 12, 1989, § 167. 
171 Ibid., par. 119. 
172 Ibid., par. 120, emphasis original. The Commission also stresses that “[d]ifferent 
European States exercise different systems for political insight into, and control over, the 
operations of the security and intelligence services, depending upon constitutional structure, 
historical factors etc. Different mechanisms exist for ensuring that particularly sensitive 
operations are subject to approval and/or adequate control. Meaningful government 
accountability to the legislature is obviously conditioned upon meaningful governmental 
control over the security and intelligence services. Where the law provides for governmental 
control, but this control does not exist in practice, the security and intelligence services risk 
becoming a ‘State within a State’. Where, on the other hand, the law provides for a degree of 
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any extrajudicial detention within the COE’s boundaries –– no matter whether 
it is maintained under the control of a foreign country or directly held by 
member states governments –– is inconsistent with article 5 of the ECHR.173 In 
particular, this inconsistency also persists when the member states fail to take 
“effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance,”174 and also 
when the ECHR violations take place in a territory, that is subject to the 
relevant treaties, under the exclusive control of foreign military forces, like the 
NATO bases. In this case, the Venice Commission emphasizes that member 
states have the precise duty to prevent and react to abuses by, for instance, 
registrating and controlling aliens’ access to the foreign military base. These 
measures are, in fact, perfectly legal under the relevant treaties, subject only to 
an obligation of notification. As another means of response, the concerned 
states could exploit diplomatic channels to issue a protest.175 
Furthermore, in assessing the problem of spatial extension of the ECHR, 
the Venice Commission pointed out that member states have an obligation to 
ensure that no violations take place in their airspace as well as in their 
territories. Thus the ECHR must receive a full implementation at the Member 
States’ level. Although the Commission was fully aware of the practical 
difficulties involved in controlling airplanes in transit, it maintained that when a 
suspect flight is at issue, states possess all the necessary instruments to react 
properly, and to ensure that those flights do not breach their human rights 
obligations.176 On this point, the Commission also concludes that “there is no 
                                                                                                                                  
distance between government ministers and officials and the day-to-day operations of the 
security and intelligence services, but government ministers in fact exercise influence or even 
control over these operations, then the phenomenon of ‘deniability’ can arise. In such a case, 
the exercise of power is concealed, and there is no proper accountability. The Statute of the 
Council of Europe and the ECHR require respect for the rule of law which in turn requires 
accountability for all exercises of public power. Independently of how  a State chooses to 
regulate political control over security and intelligence agencies, in any case effective oversight 
and control mechanisms must exist to avoid these two problems.” Ib. 
173 Ibid., par. 124. 
174 Ibid., par. 127. 
175 Ibid., par. 132. 
176 The hypothesis considered by the Venice Commission occurs when the “member 
State has serious reasons to believe that the mission of an airplane crossing its airspace is to 
carry prisoners with the intention of transferring them to countries where they would face ill-
treatment.” Ibid. par. 144. Here, the Commission recalls the Chicago Convention of 1944. See 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago on Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
The Convention applies only to civil aircraft and not to state aircrafts. Ibid., art. 3(a). However, 
the aircrafts carrying detainees are clearly “state aicrafts” for the purposes of the Convention. 
Ibid., art. 3(b) (stating that “[a]ircraft used in military […] and police services shall be deemed 
to be state aircrafts”). If the flight operators presented the airplane as a civil one, the 
Commission found a violation of art. 3(c) of the Chicago Convention, according to which “[n]o 
state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon 
without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms 
thereof.” Ibid., art. 3(c). According to the Venice Commission, in this case “[t]he territorial 
state may therefore require landing,” and proceed with searches. Venice Commission, Opinion, 
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international obligation for [member states] to allow irregular transfers of 
prisoners to or to grant unconditional overflight rights, for the purposes of 
fighting terrorism”.177 
In sum, the COE directed multiple concerns toward member states on the 
legal framework of the ERP. The general trend of COE recommendations is to 
strengthen the enforcement of human rights protection in the face of the ERP. 
As a remedy, the COE pointed to the need for a democratic legitimation of 
secret agencies’ behavior, and of the involvement of the Judiciary.178 True, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the COE has no coercive power against member 
states. Nevertheless, because of its democratic legitimation and supranational 
position, it deeply affects the behavior of national governments, and overall 
may fuel a national debate on how to implement the values protected by the 
COE: namely, the human rights enumerated under the ECHR. For our purposes, 
it can be said to strongly emphasize the actual illegality of the ERP. 
4.2.2. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION 
On February 14, 2007, an European Parliament resolution concluded that, 
although “not all those flight have been used for extraordinary rendition,” there 
were “at least 1,245 flights operated by the CIA […] into European airspace or 
stopped over at European airports between the end of 2001 and the end of 
2005.”179 This is the result of an investigation conducted by an ad hoc 
Committee, namely the Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European 
Countries by the CIA for illegal activities (TDIP). This Committee was elected 
by the Parliament in 2005 in order to determine the role of certain member 
                                                                                                                                  
supra note 165, par. 148. When the aircraft identifies itself as a state flight, but without 
revealing its mission, the Venice Commission found that the flag state violated its international 
obligation. In this case, the territorial state cannot proceed with a seizure or a search of the 
aircraft, but nevertheless it could inhibit further flights over the air space or impose them a duty 
of search, and finally protest by diplomatic channels. See Ibid., at para. 149-151. Furthermore, 
“any violations of civil aviation principles in relation to irregular transport of prisoners should 
be denounced, and brought to the attention of the competent authorities and eventually of the 
public.” Ibid., par. 152. The “competent authorities” would include, at the level on 
Convention’s enforcement, the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
[ICAO]. See Chicago Convention, cited above, art. 54(i), (j). See also Olivier Dutheillet 
Speech, supra note 35, at par. III.2. 
177 Ibid., par. 153. 
178 The Venice Commission enacted also another Opinion, concerning the role of 
intelligence agencies in democratic societies. See Report on the Democratic Oversight of the 
Security Services, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 71st Plenary Session (Venice, June 
1-2, 2007), Study no. 388/2006, CDL-AD(2007)016. 
179 EU Justice and Home Affairs, Presse Release, CIA activities in Europe: European 
Parliament adopts final report deploring passivity from some Member States, Feb. 14, 2007. 
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states of the European Union (EU) in the ERP.180 The TDIP reported on 
January 31, 2007. 
The Report focuses on three aspects. First, the TDIP affirmed that the 
ERP violates international law.181 Further, it firmly  
“[c]ondemns extraordinary rendition as an illegal instrument used by the United 
States in the fight against terrorism [and] the condoning and concealing of the 
practice, on several occasions, by the secret services and governmental authorities 
of certain European countries.”182  
More than illegal, the ERP is, in the Committee’s view, even 
counterproductive.183 Second, the TDIP – and the EP thereafter – stressed that it 
did not receive the due cooperation from both the member states and the 
European institutions, especially the EU Council of Ministers. In particular, the 
TDIP decried the fact that the lack of cooperation “has fallen far below the 
standard that Parliament is entitled to expect,”184 and formally criticized the 
refusal by some officials to appear or keep the TDIP informed.185 The 
Committee’s concerns, the Report reads, directly affect the obligations of the 
European institutions to keep the Parliament informed of the EU foreign 
policy,186 and could raise the question of responsibility of member states for 
violation of the EU Treaties.187 Moreover, the TDIP expressed its appreciation 
                                                 
180 See European Parliament [EP] Resolution on Presumed Use of European Countries 
by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, P6_TA(2005)0529, OJ C 
286 E (Nov. 23, 2006), p. 509; EP Decision Setting Up a Temporary Committee on the Alleged 
Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners 
[TDIP], P6_TA(2006)0012, OJ C 287 E (Nov. 24, 2006), p. 159. Among other purposes, the 
TDIP is charges with determining whether “such actions […] could be considered a violation 
inter alia of Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the EU-US agreements on extradition and on mutual legal 
assistance and other international treaties and agreements concluded by the European 
Union/Community and its Member States, including the North Atlantic Treaty and its related 
agreements on the status of forces and the Convention on International Civil Aviation.” Ib., p. 
160. 
181 TDIP, Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the 
Transportation and Detention of Prisoners, PE 2006/2200(INI), A6-0020/2007 (Jan. 30, 2007), 
par. 1, at pp. 5-6 (“the fight against terrorism must be fought on the basis of, and in order to 
protect, our common values of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; […] all the work carried out by the Temporary Committee is intended to make a 
contribution towards the development of clear and focused measures in the fight against 
terrorism, which are commonly accepted and respect national and international law”). 
182 Ib., par. 39, at p. 11. 
183 Ib., par. 41, at p. 11. 
184 Ib., par. 13, at p. 7. 
185 Ib., para 26, 28 (on the Counter-terrorism Coordinator), 29 (on the Director of 
Europol), 34 (on the former and current Secretaries-General of NATO), at pp. 8-9. 
186 It is the so-called “Common Foreign and Security Policy” [CFSP]. 
187 See TDIP Report, supra note 181. 
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for the judicial authorities in some member states, in particular Italy, Germany 
and Spain, and recommended that the judiciaries of other states follow these 
examples.188 While it supported the intervention of domestic courts, the TDIP 
also complained that state Executives were “turning a blind eye or admitting 
flights operated by the CIA,”189 affirming that when courts began proceedings 
against some government officials, their denial of involvement in certain 
abduction cases suggested deception.190 Finally, as to sanctions, the TDIP 
vigorously urged states and EU legislators to review the limits of the secret 
defense,191 and, more generally, it deplored the unresponsiveness of states and 
EU institutions to ERP actions within their own territories. The TDIP 
concluded by recommending, among other things, the EU Council to 
investigate the actual violation of the human rights protection clause sanctioned 
by article 6 of the EU Treaty, and adopt appropriate sanctions against the 
Member States. 
Although the TDIP’s conclusions were not exhaustive,192 one could 
predict that such a deliberation by the democratic organ of the world’s most 
powerful and highly developed international organization would have 
consequences on future assessments of the problem at the continental level. 
European institutions, particularly the Council, that represents the interests of 
Member States, will be very concerned with the EP’s pronunciations, especially 
since nobody could hide the governments’ deception on the matter. Moreover, 
three important issues are at stake: activities of secret services, counterterrorism 
measures, and interstate cooperation. If the EP retains those elements that were 
significantly threatened by the illegal ERP action, how could governments still 
defend the ERP? 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
“Such renditions are permissible under international law”193 –– 
Condoleezza Rice remarked in 2005; “[w]e do take our obligations seriously 
                                                 
188 Ib., par. 15, at p. 7; par. 186, at p. 28 (where the TDIP “[u]rges European countries 
[…] to commence such proceedings as soon as possible, [because], according to the case law of 
the [ECtHR], there is a positive obligation on Member States to investigate allegations of and 
sanction human rights violations in breach of the ECHR”). 
189 Ib., par. 43, at p. 11. 
190 Significantly, speaking of the Abu Omar case, the TDIP emphasizes that when SISMI 
officials were testifying before the Committee about their involvement in Abu Omar’s 
abduction, they were “conceal[ing] the truth.” Ibid., par. 52, at p. 12. 
191 Ibid., par. 192, at p. 29. 
192 This is actually due to the fact that several states and the European institutions 
refused to cooperate promptly with the TDIP on the ongoing investigations. See Ibid, par. 225, 
at p. 33 (noting that “the Temporary Committee was not put in a position fully to investigate all 
the cases of abuses and violations falling within its remit and that its conclusions are therefore 
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193 See supra note 33. 
MATTEO M. WINKLER 
 35
under the [CAT] [and] we are in compliance with our obligations”194 –– John 
Bellinger added. I find these two statement inconsistent with any thoughtful 
perception of the legal framework surrounding the ERP. Moreover, they are 
quite offensive toward European institutions and prominent international 
scholars, who argue exactly the contrary.195 The resistance opposed by the U.S. 
current Administration as to the legitimacy of the ERP, accompanied by the 
silence of some European government, clearly question the basis and effectivity 
of the “War on Terror:” times seem deeply changed since September 12, 2001, 
when Le Monde main title voiced a strong signal of solidarity and passion: 
“Today, we are all Americans.”196 In order to depict the present situation, the 
words of Rep. William Delahunt should suffice:  
“Sadly, this support has eroded dramatically. […] World opinion has 
turned against the United States in recent years […] this reality, this trend of 
opinion against the United States has profound negative consequences for our 
national interests.”197 
I brought some evidence that a conflict has arisen between specific 
international organizations and their member states as to the way in which the 
latter face the exigency of preventing terrorist attacks. In particular, several 
international organs made it clear that European states which collaborate with 
the ERP are accomplices to grave violations of international law, the CAT, and 
the ECHR. The common sympathies among democratic organs of the European 
organizations, like the EP and the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE, and the 
many prosecutors, judges, and inquiry commissions which are questioning the 
ERP actions at the domestic level, also raises the broader question of whether 
governmental authority in determining foreign policy is entirely consistent with 
a respect for the rule of law. If the pressures coming from these supranational 
initiatives actually trigger the concerned states to refrain from cooperating with 
the CIA in this “spider’s web,” that is an issue which still needs to be assessed. 
Although it is perhaps too early to identify practical results, it is unlikely that 
governments –– under the constraints of parliaments and courts –– would 
                                                 
194 On-The-Record Briefing on the Committee Against Torture Report, John Bellinger 
(May 19, 2006), available online at http://www.state.gov/s/l/rls/66519.htm. 
195 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Regression of the Rule of Law under the Guise of 
Combating Terrorism, 76 INT’L REV. PEN. L. 17 (2005), at p. 22, stating that ERP “is 
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Terror”: Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 
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ignore these pressures or defend the ERP. This is true not only from a legal 
standpoint, but also politically speaking. That law and politics will stand for the 
protection of human dignity and the rule of law, rather than for immediate 
political expediency, seems only a question of time.  
 
 
* * * 
